The principle of Uncertainty can be subdivided into two distinct categories: 1) Voting, and 2) Odds.

Voting is self explanatory. When it comes to a court issuing legal rulings, and some judges rule one way and some another, we are uncertain who we should follow. The rule of Majority says to follow whichever opinion has the greater number of judges.

Odds are where things get interesting. If God forbade something, such as non-kosher meat, my expectation would be that I should have to avoid any possibility of violating that commandment. Even if the odds were 1 in a trillion, still: God commanded me not to do it!

This is where majority comes into play. If, for example, I found a piece of meat on the street and there were nine kosher meat stores nearby and one non-kosher one, the odds are 9 to 1 that the meat is from a kosher store. The principle of majority states that since the majority of odds are that the meat come from a kosher store, it is permissible for me to eat it.

100% Odds

If there's a thoroughly mixed-up pot of food in front of me, and 90% is kosher and 10% is non-kosher, we have already established that it is perfectly fine for me to take a spoonful. After all, the majority of odds are that my spoonful will only contain kosher food.

But what if I want to eat the entire pot of food? Is it permitted?In Depth

The gut response is to say absolutely not! Sure I can take one spoonful and eat it, but that's simply because there is no certain violation of the law and I am relying on the majority of odds. However, if I eat the whole pot, then there's a 100% certainty that I will have consumed unkosher food!

But this is where the Rabbis spring their first surprise on us: they argue that Odds are not merely a game of, well, odds, where the Torah is merely permitting us to take a chance as long as the odds are good; rather the Torah is going even further and saying that the majority negates the minority! Meaning, that in the presence of a majority of odds, we legally consider the odds of the majority to be 100%! It as if there is no uncertainty at all, and therefore the entire pot of food may be eaten since legally we can treat the odds as being 100% that the whole thing is kosher.

Source for Voting

The source for Voting is from the Mishna in Sanhedrin 1:6, which quotes the verse in Shemos 23:2, that with regards to a court you should "Incline after the majority".

QThe problem is, who said that this verse is discussing the court?

The verse does not mention the court at all. The full verse goes: "You shall not follow the majority to do evil; and you shall not testify on a disagreement to pervert; after the majority to incline".In Depth

APerhaps we can answer, that you will note that the verse prior to this one is the start of a new section. We know this because a letter "Samuch" is placed before it, to indicate that there should be a space placed there to mark the start of a new section. Note

Note

Source for Majority Negates Minority

QThe same verse of "after the majority to incline" is used in the Talmud Chullin 11a to derive the base concept of following the Odds. This, of course, needs an explanation: the verse only talks about court; who said anything about a general rule about odds?

And even if there is some way that odds can be derived from the verse, how in the world can we also derive that the Majority Negates Minority to the point of allowing the certain violation of the law by eating an entire pot of food when some of it definitely contains non-kosher food??In Depth

AI would suggest the following:

There is a general rule throughout the Talmud that we do not require a verse if common sense would suffice (see Ketubot 22a as an example). Meaning, if basic logic would inform me about something, then there is no need for the Torah to confirm it with an explicit verse.

If this is the case, then we should ask ourselves what would we have done if the verse of "Incline after the majority" was never written? What would common sense tell us?

Well, let's start by thinking about a court case where it's a matter of money. Two parties are disputing and the majority agrees with Person A, and the minority agree with Person B. Now we have to pick one of the two sides: there's no way to get around it; either side is going to make somebody the winner and somebody the loser. I would argue that in this case common sense would tell me that since we have to pick a side to follow, it's only logical to go with the majority.In Depth

So in this case we would not need a verse to teach me to follow the majority; common sense would suffice!

However, let's say the court is disagreeing over a matter of religious observance. The majority is maintaining that the law is lenient, and the minority are maintaining that the law is stringent. In this scenario common sense would tell me to follow the minority! After all, we aren't sure which side to follow so it only makes sense that we err on the side of caution even if that side is the minority.In Depth

So now the Torah has to step in and give us an explicit verse to teach that the Majority Negates Minority! That in the presence of a majority we do not consider there to be a minority at all, and therefore even in a case where the minority opinion is more stringent, we would still follow the majority to be lenient!In Depth

Q One could challenge this of course. True, there is an explicit verse that tells me we should follow the majority. But who said that the mechanism for doing so is via the minority being negated? Maybe the minority is not negated, and the verse is simply instructing me that even though the minority is still very much present, still we should follow the majority opinion by fiat!

A Perhaps we can answer as follows: the verse starts off by asserting that "You shall not follow the majority to do evil". The Rabbis interpret "evil" here to mean "punishment", in the sense that in the case of the most serious of "punishments" - i.e. a death sentence - we should follow the minority to spare the defendant's life.Note

Presumably, this is the reason the Rabbis explain that the verse must mean that we do not convict in capital cases with a simple majority of one, but only with a majority of two.In Depth

But the key takeaway here is that the Torah is clearly saying that in capital cases we should err on the side of caution even when there is a majority the other way, and we should spare the defendant's life even though the majority is voting to convict.

If so, you may ask, then how in the world does it make sense that a majority of two is sufficient to convict?! If we are erroring on the side of caution even when it goes against a majority, then surely merely adding another judge to the conviction votes doesn't change anything!

So the only way to reconcile these two facts - 1) that we err on the side of caution in capital cases even against a majority of one, and 2) that we convict in capital cases with a majority of two - is by saying that the mechanism of following a majority of two is due to Majority Negates Minority, and thus there is no minority present to err on the side of!Note

And once we've established this principle, then it's only logical to say that the same principle is at work by all non-capital cases where a simple majority of one suffices to convict: there, too, the mechanism of conviction must be via Majority Negates Minority.

Source for Odds

QThis only answers our question about the source for Majority Negates Minority. We still need a source for the base concept of following the Odds.

A I would suggest as follows: while it is true that we have thus far established the basis of why the court must follow the majority, what is the reason that that public must follow the court majority?

Now you may think this question is quite strange: obviously when the verse commands to follow the court majority it means that the public is bound to follow their decision. Otherwise, what does it matter that we follow the court majority? Who's following it?

Well, what I really mean by my question is what is the mechanism by which the public must obey the court? And it's true that you may still be scratching your head saying "the mechanism is exactly as we have established, that by courts we follow the majority via Majority Negates Minority, and thus by fiat the public must obey"; but allow me to propose a different approach.

Because, as we pointed out above, if you scan the verse here, at first glance it does not even seem to be discussing the courts at all. The Torah made the deliberate decision to write the verse in such a way that it is only through contextual clues and logic that we can establish that we are discussing the court here.

On the surface, the verse is addressing the general public, instructing them to follow the majority.

I suggest that this deliberate choice of language is an indication that the mechanism of why the public must follow the court majority is not because of fiat - not because of a narrow principle of following the majority that applies only to the courts - but rather because there is a general principle of following the majority of odds, which translates here into following the majority of the court justices.

After all, the public is unsure what to do: should the money belong to Person A or Person B? Should the religious law be this way or that way? Says the Torah, follow the majority - whatever the majority of the court says, that is what you must follow. Not because the court is special in any way: it's just the simple application of the principle of following the Odds. And the majority of odds here - i.e. the majority of justices - are what the public must follow.

If this is the case, then it must be that Majority Negates Minority is broadly applicable as well, and not merely a concept specialized to the courts. Essentially, it follows from our arguments that whatever mechanisms the court rulings operate under, those same mechanisms must be why the public is similarly bound by the court's decision. Meaning, for example, that by capital cases where there is a majority of one to convict, the reason the public does not drag the defendant out to kill them is because of the concept of erroring on the side of caution. And the reason that by a majority of two the public does obey the court to kill the defendant, must be because of the concept of Majority Negates Minority.

Thus we have demonstrated that the principle of Odds and Majority Negates Minority are both broadly applicable as decision making tools and not merely limited to the narrow confines of court rulings.

In the mathematical world of probability, the first thing you will come across is a key distinction between types of probability: 1) Experimental Probability, and 2) Theoretical Probability.

The distinction can be illustrated by the example of flipping 10 coins simultaneously.

The Theoretical Probability is where - before we look at the results - we theorize that since for each coin one side is heads and one side is tails, then when we flip each one randomly it should come up heads 50% of the time and tails 50% of the time. Therefore, we can make a statistical and logical assumption that for any given coin out of the 10 there is a 50% chance it is heads and 50% chance it is tails.

The Experimental Probability is where we consider the 10 coins we just flipped as an experiment where we can simply look at the results. Now maybe in this experiment we got 3 heads and 7 tails. Based on these results we would say that the odds of any random coin in this set of 10 coins being heads is 30%, and 70% to be tails.

The key difference here is that by an Experimental Probability we have an exact set of real world numbers: in this case 70/30. Whereas by a Theoretical Probability all we have are assumptions.

It is in this sense that an Experimental Probability is stronger - or more true - than a Theoretical Probability. Because sure, the theoretical odds are 50/50, but we just ran an actual experiment where heads only turned up 30% of the time, which means that within the narrow bounds of this experiment the real-world odds are 70/30!

The Talmud in Chullin 11a makes this same distinction:

The Talmud has a case where there are 10 meat stores, nine of which are kosher and one which is not, and we find a piece of meat on the street and we are uncertain which store it came from. This is a case of Experimental Probability: we know exactly what the odds are here - 90/10 - and thus we can work with these definitive numbers. The Talmud calls this a Tangible Majority.

In contrast, the Talmud there gives us another case that it says is a completely different kind of Odds. The case involves a minor who performed a Levirate marriage ?; the problem is that there is a possibility that when this minor grows up they will be one of the rare people who do not go through puberty, thus retroactively invalidating the Levirate marriage (since the entire goal of this kind of marriage is to have children).Note

Source for Experimental and Theoretical Probability

Remember that thus far the only Biblical source we have for Odds comes from the verse "After the majority to incline" which is discussing a court.

Are the Odds by a court an Experimental or Theoretical Probability?

Clearly, it is an Experimental Probability. We know exactly how many judges are sitting on the court and how many voted one way and how many the other way.

Given this, the question is: what is the source for Theoretical Probability?

This is actually the Talmud's exact question in Chullin 11a. The Talmud makes the same point we just made, that for Experimental Probability we have a clear Biblical source, but no apparent source for Theoretical Probability.

In answer, the Talmud presents several Biblical verses which can only make sense if there is a principle that by Theoretical Probability we follow the Majority.

One of the proofs the Talmud brings, is from the verse in Shemos 21:15 that states that a child who strikes their parent is subject to the death penalty. The problem with this verse is that in a scenario where the child struck his father, how can we know with certainty that this is the actual father of this child? Regarding the mother obviously we could say that there can be witnesses to the birth of this child and therefore we can know with certainty that she is the mother; but even if somehow there were witnesses to the impregnation by this man, who says that the mother didn't have relations with other men and that this child belongs to one of them? Essentially, there should always be an uncertainty of parentage when it comes to the father and therefore a child who strikes him should always be off the hook.

But from the fact that the verse does not distinguish between father and mother and applies the death penalty to a child who strikes either one of them, it is proof that Biblically we must be able to rely on the fact that statistically most children belong biologically to the person that the family calls the father: thus it is a proof that we follow the Majority even by a Theoretical Probability.

Majority Negates Minority by Theoretical Probability?

QThe million dollar question is, since the principle of following the Odds by a Theoretical Probability is not derived from the verse of "After the majority to incline", then from where do we know that the Majority Negates Minority by Theoretical Probability?

After all, as we demonstrated above, we can deduce Majority Negates Minority from the ruling in the verse that by capital punishment we err on the side of caution when there is a majority of one judge, but by a majority of two we negate the minority. But this verse is only discussing Experimental Probability! From where do we know the principle of Majority Negates Minority by Theoretical Probability?

AThe answer is: who says that there is such a principle by Experimental Probability! Based on our chain of reasoning, there ought to be no such principle by Experimental Probability. And as we continue to delve into the topic of Majority it will be very interesting to keep our eyes open and see if we can find a case of Experimental Probability where the Rabbis do rely on Majority Negates Minority.

And in fact, there are many indications that there is some fundamental difference between an Experimental and Theoretical Probability where by an Experimental Probability we don't have any uncertainty left at all after we apply the Majority, whereas by Theoretical Probability we do. An example of this is brought by Rabbi Shimon Shkop? in the Shaari YosherNote

In Depth

Q I do want to point out a very serious problem with my suggestion here that there is no concept of Majority Negates Minority by Theoretical Probability. The Talmud in Kiddushun 80a has a case where there is some pure dough that is left in a house, and we later find a child standing next to the dough and holding some dough in their hand. The rule is that we always consider children to be impure: if so, then we should be concerned that maybe the child directly took the dough from the pile, and thus by touching the dough rendered the whole pile impure. However, there is also a small possibility that an adult (who we can assume is pure) took some dough from the pile and handed it to the child to play with, thus leaving the original pile of dough as pure. When faced with this uncertainty, Rabbi Meir says that since the Status Quo of this pile of dough is that it is pure (since we know for sure it started off pure), this Status Quo joins together with the minority possibility that an adult handed the dough to the child, and together the minority and the Status Quo beat the Majority. However, the Sages disagree and say that "the minority is considered like it does not exist", and thus we are left with only the Status Quo to oppose the Majority, and we have a universally agreed upon principle that Majority always beats Status Quo.

But the key point to note here, is that the Sages explicitly say that in this case - where we are dealing with a Theoretical Probability - the minority is completely negated! This is as clear a proof as it is possible to have that by Theoretical Probability we do apply the concept of Majority Negates Minority.

The problem, of course, is how do the Sages deduce that the principle of Majority Negates Minority applies to Theoretical Probability? Where and what is the source?!

A The only possibility I see here, is that it must be that the Sages understood that when the verse taught me the principle of Theoretical Probability, what the verse was doing was not to teach us a brand new, unrelated concept, but rather it was teaching us that the principle of Majority applies not only to Experimental Probability, but also to Theoretical Probability. Meaning, that there really is just a single principle of probability that works the exact same way and that we apply to both types of Probability!

Q But if this is the case, then it goes directly against the way that Rabbi Shimon Shkop? and Rabbi Akiva Eiger? understand Experimental and Theoretical Probability, because they both maintain that that these two types of probability function in completely different ways! They understand Theoretical Probability as functioning the way common sense would suggest: namely, that a Majority of Odds informs us about what the truth of the matter most likely is. Whereas by Experimental Probability, they argue that it functions purely in a legal sense, where we are uncertain of what to do and so the Torah instructs us that when faced with uncertainty we should legally rule like the Majority, but not because the Majority is revealing any kind of "Truth" to us.

But if this is the case, then how in the world can we understand that the principle of Majority Negates Minority - which the commentators such as Rashi informs us is derived from the verse of "After the majority to incline", which is the source of Experimental Probability - also gets applied to Theoretical Probability??

AI actually think that this work out quite nicely according to their opinion that Theoretical Probability is "stronger" because it is actually revealing the truth of the matter to us, whereas Experimental Probability is purely a legal fiction. Given that this is the case, perhaps they would argue that by the "stronger" probability of Theoretical Probability, of course the minority is completely negated. After all, the Majority is revealing the truth of what happened to us, and therefore we are left with no uncertainty at all. By Theoretical Probability we don't need a dedicated verse to teach me that Majority Negates Minority since it is simply logical that this is what happens. Whereas by Experimental Probability, the fact that we need the verse to also teach Majority Negates Minority is proof that Rabbi Shimon Shkop and Rabbi Akiva Eiger are correct, and that Experimental Probability is "weaker", and purely a legal construct, and thus without the verse teaching us that Majority Negates Minority by Experimental Probability we would have assumed that since it is not revealing any "truth" to us, the minority does not get negated!

Why is Theoretical Probability Stronger?

Q Of course this leaves us with an enormous problem: how do we understand the position of Rabbi Shimon Shkop and Rabbi Akiva Eiger? Why in the world would an Experimental Probability be weaker that a Theoretical Probability? After all, as we have explained, by an Experimental Probability I know for a fact what the odds are, whereas by a Theoretical Probability we don't have a certain set of numbers, rather it is just an abstract assumption!

AI believe that the answer to this is actually a critical point, and illustrates a fundamental principle about Majority.

Let us start by considering Experimental Probability. By Experimental Probability, the fact that there is a Majority is the one and only reason behind our decision to rule a certain way. Meaning, that there is no "explanation" or underlying "reason" present, rather we have to make some decision and the Torah reveals to us that when we don't know what to do we can follow the Majority of odds.

However by Theoretical Probability, the terms "probability" and "majority" are actually misnomers! Meaning, that by Theoretical Probability there is a logical reason that is compelling us to issue our decision. For example, by the case of a minor who performed a Levirate marriage, there is a proactive logic that informs us that children attain puberty: and the fact that the majority of children do indeed hit puberty is merely a demonstration of the underlying logic! So the fact that there is a "Majority" present is not what is powering our decision here: rather, it is the underlying logic - which is in turn expressed by the Majority - that powers our decision here.

So when the Talmud employs the language of "A Majority that is Tangible" to describe Experimental Probability, and "A Majority that is Theoretical" to describe Theoretical Probability, these terms are merely classifications and not explanations as to why they work. By Experimental Probability it is indeed the fact that there is a Majority probability here which determines why we rule one way over the other, but by Experimental Probability it is the underlying "logic" and "reason" that we are following, of which the Majority is merely a symptom!

To put it in other words, Theoretical Probability works just like the other Talmudic principles of Status Quo etc, where they have an underlying "logic" to them. However Experimental Probability is the exception here, and works completely differently than the other types of "proof" in the Talmud.

And this also explains nicely why Rashi and others had to explain that the Torah is teaching me specifically by Experimental Probability that Majority Negates Minority. Because unlike all the other types of "proof" in the Talmud, Experimental Probability is not a revelation of what actually happened, rather it is a legal guideline of what to do absent any logical proofs when the only thing we have are Odds. Thus it is that by all the other types of proof, of course there is no minority left at all, because the entire nature of the "proof" is to be a revelation of what the truth is; whereas by Experimental Probability, we acknowledge that we have no idea what the truth is, rather we are just defaulting to the odds of the Majority, and thus of course the minority remains. But if that is so, then as we demonstrated above, we have a problem, because the Torah cares about the minority, and therefore the only way that Experimental Probability can work, is if there is a dedicated rule that by Experimental Probability the Majority Negates Minority!

And once the Torah does teach me that Majority Negates Minority by Experimental Probability, then we deduce that even if there is a 100% odds of violating the minority, still, the Torah created a new rule by Experimental Probability that the minority is completely negated, and thus we consider it like it doesn't exist. But if it were possible to have a 100% certainty of violating the minority by Theoretical Probability or by Status Quo or by any of the other classical "proofs", I would say that you would not be able to violate the minority, because there is no special rule of Majority Negates Minority like we find by Experimental Probability, rather the minority is logically considered irrelevant since we have determined what the truth of the matter is: but let's say there was a 100% chance of violating the minority, then of course you would be forbidden because clearly the truth of the matter here is that there is a present minority!Note

The Rabbis appear to assert that there is a general rule by Odds: the elements that comprise the Odds must be mixed together until they are indistinguishable from each other. Thus, by the case we have been discussing thus far where a pot of food has a majority of kosher food and a minority of non-kosher food inside it, the two food types must be thoroughly mixed together until they are indistinguishable from each other.

One example the Talmud brings is the leafy covering (the Scach ?) that is required to cover the top of a Succah ?. What happens if invalid Scach is mixed in with kosher Scach?Note

The Talmud in Succah 9b discusses what happens when a tree is overhanging a Succah. Branches of a tree that are still attached to the tree are invalid for Scach, and thus should invalidate the kosher Scach since they are hanging in the airspace above the Succah, and yet we say that the Succah is kosher. The Talmud explains that we must be talking about a case where a person deliberately lowered the branches of the tree until they were completely mixed in with the branches of the kosher Scach. And Rashi comments that it must be where the kosher Scach is the majority, and where the branches of the invalid Scach are so thoroughly mixed in that one cannot tell the difference.

It is thus clear that Rashi's opinion is that in order for a Majority to apply, the elements under consideration must be so thoroughly mixed together that you cannot tell the difference between them.

QThis begs the question: where does Rashi know this from?

After all, we learn the rule of Majority from "After the majority to incline" which is discussing a court: and by a court the opinions of the judges are not all mixed together and indistinguishable from each other, rather they are all distinct and separate! So from where does Rashi learn that the invalid and kosher Scach must be completely mixed together?

AThe answer is actually quite simple. The classic case the Talmud in Chullin 11a gives as an example for Majority is where there are 10 meat stores, nine of which are kosher and one which is not, and a piece of meat is found on the street and we don't know which store it came from.

There as well, the stores are all distinct from each other just like the justices of a court.

But of course, the answer is that both by the case of the 10 meat stores and the case of the judges we are dealing with uncertainty! We have an unresolved question about which store this meat came from and which opinion of the justices we should follow. So in the face of uncertainty we apply the laws of Majority.

But in the case of Scach, if the types of Scach are not mixed together then they remain distinguishable and there is nothing here that we are uncertain about: after all, I can look up at the Scach and clearly see that over here is kosher Scach and there is invalid Scach; what uncertainty is there?

That is why Rashi says that in cases like this it must be that the types of Scach have been thoroughly mixed together to the point where looking up we cannot tell what is what: because now we have created an uncertainty regarding the Scach and therefore can apply the laws of Majority!

Scach vs Court

But let us think about this for a minute.

True, we can make a solid distinction between the case of Scach and the case of the 10 meat stores: by the meat stores we truly have complete uncertainty regarding which store this particular piece of meat came from.

However, by the court, we know exactly which opinion belongs to which judge, and our only question is who should we follow?

QSo why is this not the same as Scach? By Scach we also know that this section has kosher Scach and that section does not, but we have a question whether the Succah as a whole is kosher or not! So why is this not a similar type of uncertainty, where we know all the facts and we are just unsure what the final, single ruling ought to be?

To add onto this question, let us discuss another case where we can clearly see an identifiable minority and yet still we say that we should follow the majority.

The case is by the ritual slaughtering of an animal. The law is that the trachea and esophagus must both be cut in order for the slaughtering to be kosher.

The question is: what if only the majority of the trachea and esophagus were cut? Do we say that this is a kosher slaughtering or not?

This case is very similar to the Scach and the judges: by all three cases we have an identifiable minority and we are faced with an uncertainty whether to follow the majority or minority status.

The fascinating answer is that the Talmud clearly considers the slaughter case as something completely different from the court case, to the point where the Talmud requires a completely separate verse to teach it to us!

The Talmud in Nazir 42a discusses the verse in Bamidbar 6:9 which says regarding a Nazir ? that at the end of his Nazirite period "He should shave his head on the day he becomes pure, on the seventh day he shall shave it". The Talmud infers from the repetition of mentioning shaving that the Torah is teaching us that the Nazir must shave his entire head.

The Talmud points out: why does the verse have to teach me that the entire head should be shaved? If the verse had simply said that the requirement is for the Nazir to shave his head, wouldn't I have assumed the Torah meant the entire thing?

It must be, says the Talmud, that the Torah is teaching us a new principle called Majority Equals Entirety: that had the Nazir just shaved a majority of his hair then it would be considered as if he shaved the entire thing! And therefore the Torah has to tell us that while that is a true principal generally, by a Nazir specifically you actually do have to shave every single hair (and it is this principle of Majority Equals Entirety that the Talmud also applies to the law of slaughtering the majority of the trachea and esophagus).

So clearly the Talmud feels that it needs this verse by Nazir to teach us to follow the majority.

The question is: why can't we just apply the classic verse of "After the majority to incline"?! As we pointed out above, by both the Nazir and the court there is a distinct minority that is not mixed in with the majority, and yet by the court we see that still we follow the majority. If so, then the same should apply by a Nazir! There too I would say that if he shaved the majority of his hair, then even though the minority is still clear and apparent, still we negate it via the majority!

After all, by both cases we are unsure of what the final ruling should be: by the court we are unsure which way to rule, and by the Nazir we are unsure whether we should consider the entire head shaved or not when only a majority has been cut!

The Maharitz Chiyus ? on the Talmud in Nazir 42a asks this exact question.

AHe gives an incredible answer that exposes for us an entirely new dimension in the topic of Majority (this, of course, is my understanding of his answer which is quite terse).

He argues that there is a key distinction between the cases of Nazir and a court.

By a court and by the case of the 10 meat stores, all we need is to consider the minority as if it does not exist (i.e. Majority Negates Minority). Once there is no minority remaining then of course we are left with the 100% odds of the majority and is is only natural that we follow that majority.

However by a Nazir, merely considering the minority as if it is non-existent is insufficient! The commandment by a Nazir is to perform the action of shaving his head. Given that, then whatever hairs are left uncut are actively opposing us being able to say "he has performed an act of cutting on all his hairs"; after all, no act of cutting occurred to these minority of hairs left remaining on his head!

So saying that we consider it like those hairs don't exist won't work. The commandment was specifically that an action of cutting must be performed on all the hairs of head, and when the cutting was complete, some of the hairs that we started off by saying they must be cut are left uncut!

Thus, the Torah comes to teach us a new principle: that not only does Majority Negates Minority as we already learn from the courts, but additionally Majority Equals Entirety to the point where we take whatever actions were performed on the majority and consider it as if they were also performed on the minority! This is very different from Majority Negates Minority where all we are saying is that we are considering it like there is no minority here at all and that the minority is merely subsumed into the majority; instead, by Majority Equals Entirety we are very much recognizing and aware of the minority, but we are simply taking the status and actions of the majority and applying them to the minority as well!

This explanation by the Maharitz Chiyus also ties in nicely with the language the Talmud uses to describe this concept: Majority Equals Entirety. Meaning, that the majority extends its statuses and actions to include the minority, not to merely negate it.

(And as for why we cannot apply the concept of Majority Equals Entirety to courts and meat stores, see:In Depth

QHowever, while this does answer our question regarding the distinction between a Nazir and a court, it does not answer our question regarding the distinction between Scach and a court. After all, we see by Scach that it must be mixed together until the minority is indistinguishable from the majority, so clearly Scach is not a case of Majority Equals Entirety since by cases like the Nazir it is fine if the minority is present and identifiable.In Depth

AI suggest the following answer: there is actually a real distinction between the cases of Scach and the court.

By the court, the elements that are comprising the majority and minority are not a part of the actual uncertainty. What I mean by this is that by a court, we have an external uncertainty regarding what law to follow or who to give the money to, and we are leveraging the Odds by the court to enable us to make a decision on this separate thing. We can call this External Odds.

The same goes for the case of 10 meat stores. Over there as well, our uncertainty is regarding the meat, and we are just referencing the external stores to enable us to come up with a decision based on those external odds.

However by Scach the uncertainty and the odds are all on one and the same thing! The uncertainty is whether the Scach is kosher, and the majority and minority are both comprised of the self-same Scach that we are evaluating! We can call this Intrinsic Odds.

So when we are dealing with External Odds, like by the court and the 10 meat stores, the minority is not as tangible a thing vis-a-vis the actual item under consideration. Whereas when we deal with Intrinsic Odds, like by Scach, the minority is very much a physical reality that is embedded into the very uncertainty that we are facing! So no wonder that even though by a court and 10 meat stores the minority can be distinct, by Scach where the minority is that much more present and difficult to negate do we require that it be actually mixed in and indistinguishable from the majority.

ABut the truth is, I think we can give an even better, more true answer.

If you think about a court, the court is examining uncertainties that already exist in the real world. For example, Person A says that Person B owes me money. Nobody else knows if this is true or not; the two parties come to the court and now the court is presented with a preexisting uncertainty: did Person A lend money to Person B or not? The majority of the court rules one way and the minority rules the other way, and the Torah tells us to follow the majority of Odds - i.e. the majority of the court.

But the key point here is that a real uncertainty about the facts already exists!In Depth

Whereas by Scach there is no uncertainty about the facts! We know that the majority of the Scach is kosher and the minority is non-kosher and we can point to exactly where the minority of non-kosher Scach is since it is not all mixed up with the kosher Scach. This is why the Scach must be completely mixed together: because otherwise there is no uncertainty to which we can apply the principles of probability!Note

This would also the answer the question we asked as to the difference between a Nazir and a court. By a Nazir there is no uncertainty regarding the facts: we can see that the majority of hairs were shaved and the minority still remain. How can we possibly apply the principle of probabilities when there is no uncertainty at all (and the same would go for the case of ritual slaughter)?In Depth

It is based on this answer that I began this piece on Majority by stating that there are 2 primary applications: 1) Uncertainty and 2) State.

Uncertainty we have discussed, and State is relevant to the Nazir and to cutting the trachea/esophagus: by both cases there is nothing uncertain about the facts, we just want to know what State the item under consideration is in.

Types of Minority

From what we have discussed thus far there arises 3 levels in how a Minority is treated when it encounters a Majority:

1) The minority is considered as if it is not here at all (like the simple understanding of Majority Negates Minority).

2) The minority is subsumed and incorporated into the majority (like we find by Scach).

3) The minority is maintained as distinct from the majority, but we just apply the statuses of the majority to the minority (like the opinion of the Maharitz Chiyus by Nazir).

Level #1 is the most straightforward understanding of Majority Negates Minority: in the case of the judges or by the 10 meat stores we consider the minority as if they don't exist at all.

The distinction between #1 and #2 can be illustrated by the following case: let us say that we have a case of Scach where the total amount of Scach only covers 60% of the Succah. This is still considered a kosher Succah since the majority is Scach. However, let's say that when we examine the Scach itself we find that only 60% of the Scach is comprised of kosher Scach and 40% is non-kosher Scach.

According to Level #1 where we consider the minority to be nonexistent, then all we are left with here is 36% kosher Scach (60% of 60%); and of course, that would mean that there is no majority of kosher Scach on the Succah and therefore the Succah would not be considered kosher!

But according to Level #2, where we say the minority is subsumed into the majority, it means that we would consider the kosher Scach to actually comprise 60% of the total covering of the Succah, thus rendering it Kosher!

To be fair though, it would appear that Level #1 is not actually a recognized option. The language itself of "Majority Negates Minority" is suggestive, since the Hebrew word for "negate" here is "batul" which implies a subsuming into a larger thing. Also, since we do have a case where the Scach comprises only 60% - and of that only 60% is kosher - and yet we say that we do apply Majority Negates Minority to it which renders the entire Succah kosher, it must be that Level #1 is not something we apply.Note

There is an extraordinary and very difficult to understand exception to the general rule that we follow the Majority by uncertainty. Because we know that as a rule the principle of Majority is very compelling: we will follow it even when dealing with life-and-death matters. And yet, there is one huge exception where we do not follow the Majority: financial matters.

The Talmud in Bava Kama 27b explains that according to the Mishna we do not follow Majority by financial matters. The Mishna is actually following the opinion of Shmuel who has a disagreement with Rav in Bava Kama 46b whether we follow Majority by financial matters: Rav says that we do and Shmuel says we do not. The general rule in the Talmud is that we follow Shmuel's opinion when it comes to financial matters, thus the Mishna maintains that we do not follow Majority when it comes to money.

The million dollar question is why? According to Shmuel why is it that Majority is strong enough for us to follow by capital cases, yet it is not strong enough for us to follow by financial cases? How does this make sense?

The Talmud in Bava Kama 46b actually gives a reason for Shmuel. And the reason is, because The Burden of Proof is On the Claimant. This is a general principle that we find all over the Talmud: if Person A is trying to collect money from Person B, the burden of proof is upon Person A.

But what exactly is the nature of this principle? At first glance I would assume that it is just the standard principle of Status Quo: namely, that we default to assuming that the current status of something is the same status it originally had, and therefore since Person B has been holding onto the money, Status Quo should inform us that they should continue to hold it. But if this is true, then the Talmud should have said so! The Talmud should have said that there's a regular Status Quo here; but instead, the Talmud appears to come up with a "new" principle of Burden of Proof. So if it's not Status Quo then what exactly is it?

The Talmud actually acknowledges that this is a new principle, distinct from Status Quo; the Talmud therefore asks, well, what is the source of this new principle?

Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani ? says that the source is from the verse in Shemos 24:14 in which Moshe is preparing to ascend Sinai, and he tells the elders that although he (Moshe) will be absent, "Behold Ahron and Chur are with you; whosoever has a claim shall approach them". Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani highlights that the word "approach" can also be used as "submit", in the sense that whoever has a claim - i.e. the claimant - should "submit" evidence to the court: in other words, the verse is teaching us that The Burden of Proof is On the Claimant.

The commentaries point out that the phrase "whosoever has a claim" is singular, because we have no expectation that the other party involved - i.e. the defendant - needs to say anything or submit any kind of evidence; merely the fact that they are currently in possesion of the item under dispute is sufficient for them to have standing.

Rav Ashi disagrees with Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani and says that there is no need for a verse, since this principle of the Burden of Proof is purely logical; after all "one who suffers from pain goes to the doctor".

Now, what exactly does Rav Ashi mean? Remember, he is agreeing with Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani, he just thinks that we don't need a verse to teach us that The Burden of Proof is On the Claimant, rather we can deduce this principle logically.

So if we examine Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani carefully, we will notice that the subject of the verse is the court; namely, that the court should not recognize any standing for the claimant until they bring evidence. And this is really the fundamental principle: that when it comes to civil law, there are always two parties who must have standing in this case in order for it be even considered as a legitimate court case: the claimant and the defendant. Whereas in criminal cases - such as capital punishment - there is no requirement for there to be two parties: as soon as Person A kills Person B this becomes a matter for the court and is a legitimate court case.

Thus, the Torah is teaching us a basic principle of civil law: that when it comes to financial matters - when Person A is claiming money from Person B - the court does not even consider there to be a case here at all until the claimant brings absolute proof (like witnesses).

And when Rav Ashi says that we can determine this principle purely logically, and that "one who suffers from pain goes to the doctor", the "doctor" in his metaphor is the court: meaning, that just like a doctor does not just go over to random people and start diagnosing them, rather the doctor needs patients to first come to him and describe their symptoms, the same is true by a court, that a court cannot just assume that a claimant has standing, rather the claimant has to bring absolute proof that they actually have a real claim!

And now we can understand quite beautifully why it is that by life-and-death matters we do follow the Majority, but by financial matters we do not: because uniquely by civil cases the court does not even consider that there is a case here at all until the claimant brings absolute proof. Therefore, it doesn't make a difference if the claimant has Majority on their side or Status Quo or any other kind of useful proof; without absolute proof (like witnesses) there is no court case here at all and thus no other kinds of evidence can be presented. Whereas by capital cases, we do recognize that there is an active court case, and thus of course we can make use of Majority or Status Quo etc.

This also works very nicely to explain why it is that by the courts themselves we follow the Majority of judges even when they are ruling on financial matters. Because at face value the fact that we do not follow Majority by financial matters should also extend to following the Majority of judges on a court: and of course, this is clearly not true, but why is it not true? Well, now we have a good explanation: the issue of whether to follow the Majority of judges or not has nothing to do with having standing in a court case. It is a completely unrelated issue, and thus it makes perfect sense for us to follow the Majority.

The case in the Talmud in Succah 9b is where the person deliberately lowered the invalid Scach of the tree until it was thoroughly mixed in with the kosher Scach.

The question is: how in the world is it permitted for a person to deliberately create uncertainty?!

It is not true uncertainty: it is artificial and manufactured!

After all, the source for the principle of following the Odds is learned from the courts, and by the courts the uncertainty is genuine!

Upon further consideration, there are actually two separate issues here: 1) artificially creating the uncertainty (Artificial Uncertainty), and 2) the ability to genuinely resolve the uncertainty (Resolvable Uncertainty).

What I mean by Resolvable Uncertainty is that true, right now as I'm looking up at the Scach and the kosher and invalid Scach is all mixed together I do have an uncertainty about which Scach is which - but I also have a simple way to resolve the uncertainty: let me just lift the branches of the tree back up and separate them from the kosher Scach!

By the case of the courts or the 10 meat stores, there is no way to resolve the uncertainty, so we are forced to rely on the principle of Odds. But by Scach we can resolve the uncertainty quite easily!

The Talmud in Chullin 11b actually deals with exactly this question. Do we apply the principle of Odds only where it is not possible to resolve the uncertainty, or do we apply it even where we can resolve the uncertainty?

Per Rashi, the Talmud's conclusion is that we do apply the principle of Odds even where we can resolve the uncertainty.In Depth

Source for Artificial and Resolvable Uncertainties

I have yet to find an explicit discussion of a source for Artificial and Resolvable Uncertainties; I am sure someone discusses it I just have to find it.

But if I could offer an explanation, I think there's actually a fairly straightforward source.

As we've discussed above, the source for following the Majority comes from the verse of "After the majority to incline" which is discussing a court of law.

If you think about the uncertainty we have regarding which opinion to follow in a court, it is both an Artificial and Resolvable Uncertainty!

It is an Artificial Uncertainty because we watch it be created right in front of us: there was no accident of nature that created the uncertainty - the judges created the uncertainty right in front of us by having disagreeing opinions! After all, they could have come to a unanimous decision!

And it is also a Resolvable Uncertainty because there's a simple solution here: just wait until there's a unanimous vote one way or the other! Of course, it's not a certainty that they will be able to come to a unanimous decision, but it's certainly more resolvable than the classic case of finding meat on the street and not knowing if it came from nine kosher stores or one non-kosher store: by the meat on the street it is impossible that there will ever be a resolution! Here by the courts it is certainly possible and resolvable and yet still the Torah says that we should follow the majority.

What would happen if a Succah has majority kosher Scach and a minority of non-kosher Scach all mixed together until they are indistinguishable, and then later on we undid the mixing until it became clear which part was kosher Scach and which part was non-kosher?

Well, based on our discussion thus far, I would argue that the Succah would now be considered invalid. After all, the only reason that we applied the principle of Majority Negates Minority to the non-kosher Scach is because since it was all mixed in with the kosher Scach we are presented with an Uncertainty for every inch of the Scach, and in the presence of a real uncertainty we can apply the principle of Majority Negates Minority.

But this is only while the uncertainty persists! Once the uncertainty is removed, we can no longer apply the principle of Majority Negates Minority and thus the Succah must now be considered invalid!

Since we consider Majority Negates Minority to simply be a means to resolve uncertainty, it makes sense that it can only be applied when uncertainty is present.

However, this case would appear to be a problem according to the way that Rabbi Shimon Shkop? understand the mechanics of Majority.

Rabbi Shimon ShkopNote

But given that in the case of the mixed-up Scach we actually change the legal ruling of the non-kosher Scach to be kosher; and given that this principle has nothing to do with resolving uncertainty, rather it is just a generic principle of the Torah; then once we have applied the principle of Majority Negates Minority and changed the non-kosher Scach to have a ruling of kosher, then even if later on we remove the uncertainty by separating the two Schachs from each other, the ruling that converted the non-kosher Scach to kosher should still be in effect!

Sources for Rabbi Shimon Shkop

As for how these two separate principles can be deduced from the single verse of "After the majority to incline", Rabbi Shimon Shkop points out that there are actually two different types of court cases: 1) a resolution of an argument, for example whether Person A owes Person B money or not, in which case that Rabbis are merely determining what the preexisting truth is, and 2) the creation of a new ruling, for example, when applying a penalty to someone we cannot say that the penalty was preexisting, rather it must be that the court is creating it completely on its own.

Regarding case #1, Rabbi Shimon Shkop points out that there is no need for us to say that the Torah is changing the nature of the minority to be aligned with the majority. After all, all that we are saying is that we have an uncertainty before us and that the Torah has said that we can rely on the majority of odds to determine how we should act.

However, regarding case #2, the court is creating something which did not previously exist. So if we say that the minority persists then we currently have two different rulings that have been created: one ruling that this person should get the penalty, and one ruling that this person should not get the penalty. These two rulings would conflict and now the public would be faced with a problem: which ruling of the court should we follow? Therefore, says Rabbi Shimon Shkop, it must be that the mechanism the Torah is utlizing here is that the majority of the court negates the minority of the court, and thus we are left with only the majority ruling for the public to follow!

I have several problems with his approach however:

QFirst of all, Rabbi Shimon Shkop's whole premise is that the case of the 10 meat stores is fundamentally different from the case of Scach mixed up together, in that by the 10 meat stores we cannot apply negation, whereas by the Scach we can. My question is, according to his understanding, how do we determine that principal from the cases of the court? After all, according to Rabbi Shimon Shkop we only say Majority Negates Minority regarding the court creating a ruling: but in that scenario there is nothing remotely similar to the elements being all mixed up like we find by Scach! The rulings of the judges are all distinguishable from each other! So why would we not apply the principle of Majority Negates Minority to cases where the elements are not mixed up just like the opinions of the judges are not mixed up?!In Depth

QAnother problem I have, is how do we learn from the case of the courts that the minority opinion becomes subsumed into the majority? Maybe it is just negated entirely and we consider it like it does not exist at all!

ARegarding the second question, I actually think that Rabbi Shimon Shkop's approach has a better answer than my approach:

According to Rabbi Shimon Shkop, when it comes to the court creating a ruling - like when they issue a penalty - there cannot be any differing rulings from the court, because if so then those rulings would also take effect and now the public will be presented with conflicting rulings. Given that, merely negating the ruling of the minority is a difficult approach to take since there is right now a real and active minority of judges who are clearly issuing a ruling! An easier approach is to say we do acknowledge the minority of justices, however the mechanism of the Torah is that we co-opt their ruling and subsume it into the majority!

And this would, however, pose a problem with my approach to the topic, because I am arguing that the mechanism of Majority Negates Minority exists purely to prevent us from utilizing the principle of erroring on the side of caution. Given that, then simple negation is the simpler approach to take, and from where do we know that the minority is subsumed into the majority?

AI would actually suggest another answer to the second question which will answer equally well for both Rabbi Shimon Shkop's approach and my approach:

The law is that for certain legal matters the court must have a specific size. For example, according to the Mishna in Sanhedrin 1:4, for capital cases a court of 23 is required.

Given this, if the way Majority Negates Minority works is through an actual negation of the minority, then we would find that there are insufficient judges present! After all, the opinion of the minority has been completely negated and we are to treat it like it does not exist!

Therefore, it must be that we do not negate the minority, rather we subsume it into the majority!

Based on what we have discussed thus far, it is clear that Majority is primarily based around the logic of probability, with a certain element of Torah-imposed guidelines. Meaning, it makes logical sense to say that we follow the majority, but the Torah has to teach us that the Majority Negates Minority.

All this being said, there is another huge component of uncertainty which is truly Torah-based and does not have any logical basis whatsoever.

I am referring to the principle of: Established Things Have 50/50 Odds.

What this means is that if the minority that is under discussion is an "Established Thing", then we automatically consider the odds to be 50/50 (even if the minority is one in a million!)

For example: let's say there was an unmarried woman who had a baby. Our uncertainty is that we don't know who the father: is he someone who will negatively affect the heritage of her baby or not?Note

Once again, we have to point out that this is NOT a logical law! This is purely a principle of the Torah that we must follow. That being said, we do need to understand the mechanisms of this concept and where and when we can apply it.

Source for Established Things

The Talmud in Sanhedrin 79a discusses the opinion of the Sages by a case where there were nine Jewish men and one gentile in a group, and a person threw a deadly missle into the group which struck and killed a Jew; they were not aiming for anyone in specific, but they were intending to kill. Since we only issue the death penalty for killing a Jew, the question is do we say that this person should get the death penalty or not?Note

Now, if the case was where it was just one Jew and one gentile, and the assailant threw a deadly missle without specific aim (but with intent to kill either of them) and ended up killing the Jew, the Sages maintain that he is not liable for the death penalty. The reason is because the assailant can maintain that it was only 50/50 whether he would kill a Jew or gentile, and by matters of capital punishment when we are equally uncertain we generally are lenient and do not apply the death penalty.

But in the case of nine Jews and one gentile, our assumption would be that we should apply the principle of Majority and say that since the majority of people in the group were Jewish, we consider it as if the group was 100% Jewish and thus the assailant should certainly be held liable for murder!

In response to this, the Torah wrote a verse in Devarim 19:11/12: "And when there will be a man who hates his fellow and lies in wait for him and rises against him and strikes a fatal blow and kills him, and then flees to one of these [sanctuary] cities. The elders of his city shall send and retrieve him from there, and put him in the hands of the blood-avenger and he shall die." The Talmud deduces from the emphasis on "him" in the words "wait for him and rises against him", that the assailant has to actually be 100% sure that their deadly action will result in a death sentence, and that in the specific kind of case we are discussing here, where the Majority is Jewish and the minority gentile, since the minority is Established we will apply the principle of Established Things Have 50/50 Odds and say that since the odds are an even 50/50 here, it is like the case where there is one Jew and one gentile where we say that we are lenient by capital punishment and thus the assailant cannot be held liable for murder

Universal Principle

This principle that Established Things Have 50/50 Odds is then applied universally throughout the Talmud.

But what is exactly is the nature of this principle? Is there any kind of underlying logic at all?

On the face of it, the rule we established is pretty straighforward (if difficult to understand logically): when something is "Established" we do not negate the odds, and instead we consider the odds as a 50/50 split.

And in fact, we can actually give a fairly coherent explanation for how it works. Our understanding thus far of the mechanics of Majority is that really from a Torah view whenever there is a minority present we have to keep it under consideration and consider the matter as an equal uncertainty. It is only through the mechanics of Majority Negates Minority that this is resolved, since the Majority actively negates the minority, and therefore once it is negated and gone, we are left exclusively with the majority and of course we therefore follow it. Given this, the principle that Established Things Have 50/50 Odds actually makes a lot of sense: if the minority is important enough then it cannot be simple "negated"; thus, when the minority is Established, we have to take the minority into account and are therefore forced into considering it like 50/50 odds

QIf this is true, however, then why by the case of Scach that we discussed above do we say that when the kosher and non-kosher Scach is all mixed together we do apply the principle of Majority Negates Minority? The minority of non-kosher Scach is literally physically present right now in front of us. It's as "Established" as something can possibly be!

A I would argue that there is an even deeper underlying logic to the principle of Established Things Have 50/50 Odds, and that that underlying logic nicely explains why we do not apply this principle to the case of Scach.

The context of the verse is around determining what the assailant's intent was: the Torah requires that the assailant have full intent to commit an action that would result in the death penalty; anything less than that is insufficient. Thus, the Torah introduces a new principal: while it's true that from a purely mathematical and scientific perspective the odds are identical regardless of whether something is "Established" or not, from a HUMAN perspective Established Things have more weight and are not merely intellectual, numerical abstractions! In the actual case that the Talmud discusses, where there are 10 people in front of me, nine of them Jewish and one gentile, the one gentile being physically in front of me makes the minority harder mentally negate versus when we are just discussing an abstraction of odds.

Given this, we can understand why by the case of Scach merely mixing it up together means that we do not apply the principle of Established Things Have 50/50 Odds. By the Scach, when I look at the mixed-up Scach from my human perspective, I do not see the minority at all, since it is completely mixed in until it is indistinguishable. Thus the principle of Established Things Have 50/50 Odds cannot be applied!

Q The question, of course, is how are we able to deduce from this verse a universal principle of Established Things Have 50/50 Odds? The entire context of the verse is around determining what the assailant's intent was, and it is in this narrow context that the Torah teaches us that when a person is faced with a physically "Established", distinct minority, we are to consider it like 50/50 odds. But that makes sense here, where we are trying to determine what the assailant's intent was! Since Established Things carry more weight to the human mind, we say that when a minority is Established it cannot be negated from a person's perspective: but in all other cases where a person's intent is irrelevant, who says we apply the principle of Established Things Have 50/50 Odds?

For example, by the case where an unmarried woman visited a man and conceived, why should we apply the principle of Established Things Have 50/50 Odds? Her intent doesn't factor in here at all!

AThe most likely answer is per what the Maharatz Chiyus writes in his Mevo HaTalmud, that there is an entire class of Talmudic deductions where the intent is not to suggest that purely from first principles we can deduce something from the verse, rather that the Oral Law already passed down a Torah fact and the Sages just wanted to associate this preexisting fact with a Biblical source. So in our case, the Sages must have presumably already known that there is a general principle of Established Things Have 50/50 Odds that applies universally, and the Sages just wanted to determine a "hook" of sorts from the Biblical text to attach the principle to.

Are Judges Established Things?

QThe Mordechai ? in Chullin Note

In Depth

ABut based on our understanding earlier in this piece, we can explain this quite nicely.

A court is dealing with an external uncertainty. Meaning to say, that the uncertainty confronting us is not about which judges to follow, but rather about the case that is before the court: for example where Person A is saying that Person B owes them money, there is an uncertainty whether that is true or not. The court is weighing in on that uncertainty and when there is a disagreement between the judges we follow the majority. But the key thing here that the case of the judges is similar to the case where we find meat on the street which could have come from either the nine kosher stores or the one non-kosher one: by the meat case, the stores themselves are Established Things, but because our uncertainty is directly regarding the meat and only indirectly leveraging the external odds of the stores, we do not consider it to be a case of Established Things Have 50/50 Odds. The same is true by a court: by a court, as well, it's true that the judges themselves are considered Established Things, but they are not the actual thing that is under consideration: the thing that is under consideration is whether Person B owes Person A money!In Depth

Is Majority a Physical Truth or a Legal Truth?

What I mean to say, is that one could understand that the principal of Majority is akin to a natural law, in the sense that it reveals to us the most likely physical reality of the item under consideration. Did the meat on the street come from a kosher store or a non-kosher store? The principle of Majority would reveal to me that since the majority of Odds are that it came from a kosher store, we can safely assume that that is the Physical Truth.

The other approach is to argue that we view Majority not as a revelation of the Physical Truth, but as a purely legal construct where in the face of uncertainty the Torah says that should follow the Majority not because the majority is the best indication of what the physical truth is, but rather because we have to choose something and the Torah is just asserting by fiat that we should follow the Majority.

There are many, many indications that the Torah considers Majority to be a Legal Truth.

For example, as we have discussed above, the Torah informs us of a noval principle called Majority Negates Minority, that in the presence of a Majority we can treat the minority of Odds as if they are nonexistant and thus we are left with a 100% certainty. This principle clearly only works as a legal construct: only by fiat can we assert that the physical nature of something should be treated differently than it clearly is; for example, by a pot of food that has a majority of kosher food mixed together with a minority of non-kosher, and yet we say you can eat the entire pot since we consider the entire thing to be 100% kosher: clearly, this is just false from a physical perspective; ergo, it must be that Majority is a Legal Truth.